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An Institutional Perspective on the
Medical Malpractice Crisis
Introduction by Sarah Guyton*
As Vice President of Insurance, Risk, Quality Management & Legal
Services for the University HealthSystem Consortium (UHC), Barbara J.
Youngberg is a national expert in healthcare risk management and patient
safety. Her position at the UHC supports risk reduction, patient safety,
quality management, and legal, regulatory, and compliance services for
numerous academic medical centers across the United States, Japan,
Australia, and Switzerland. She is also responsible for the design and
management of group professional liability and provider excess insurance
programs for the UHC. In addition to serving as Vice President at UHC,
Ms. Youngberg is an adjunct professor at Loyola University Chicago
School of Law and has written numerous books and articles on nursing
ethics, risk finance, insurance, patient safety, and healthcare law.
Speaking at Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Annual Health
Law and Policy Colloquium, Ms. Youngberg addressed the current medical
malpractice crisis from an institutional perspective. Acknowledging the
depth and breadth of the crisis, Ms. Youngberg urged healthcare institutions
to seek solutions internally via risk management. With twenty years of
knowledge and experience in the field, Ms. Youngberg discussed the
evolution of risk management and specifically focused on its functions of
loss prevention, claims management, and risk financing. Ms. Youngberg
concluded by offering the key to overcoming the medical malpractice crisis:
an institutional risk management system designed to eliminate all
preventable medical errors.
I. OVERVIEW

The rising cost of medical malpractice insurance coverage and the
escalation of malpractice verdicts and settlements have attracted increasing
attention over the last few years. Although there is much speculation about
the causes of the crisis, the problems are typically attributed to a legal tort
Student, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, class of 2005. Ms. Guyton is a
member of the Annals of Health Law and will be the Editor-in-Chief for 2004-05.
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system badly in need of reform coupled with an insurance industry that
engages in sub-optimal underwriting practices or is unable to manage its
Historically, healthcare providers, administrators, and
investments.'
legislators have blamed the deficiencies of the legal system and the
insurance industry for high malpractice insurance premiums, 2 the exodus of
healthcare organizations from certain specialties,3 and a lower level of
quality in patient care.4 Now, having survived two prior medical
malpractice crises and in the midst of a third,5 healthcare providers are still
focusing on issues beyond their control instead of directing their efforts
toward those aspects of the problem they can control.6 Instead of enacting
changes within the healthcare organizations at-large, providers are allowing
themselves to become preoccupied with errors inherent in the human
condition such as individual forgetfulness, inattention, and carelessnesserrors which generally give rise to malpractice claims. 7
In addition, by shifting blame to scapegoats of the past-the legal system
and the insurance industry-healthcare providers are failing to ask the
appropriate questions which may alleviate the crisis. They are failing to
consider their own role in the current system of injury and compensation.
They are minimizing patient safety practices in light of competing
economic pressures and are refusing to disclose preventable medical errors
for fear of inciting litigation. This may actually be fueling the malpractice
crisis. They are not questioning or seeking to improve the aspects of
running a healthcare business that allow for the delivery of safe and
effective care. These oversights, against the highly publicized backdrop of
tragedy which results from preventable medical error, make it difficult to
blame the current crisis on the legal system and the insurance industry
entirely.
The Institute of Medicine (1OM) report, To Err Is Human, suggests that
between 44,000 and 98,000 patient deaths are attributable to preventable

1. David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice,350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 283, 284-88
(2004).
2. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical MalpracticeCrisis, 348 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 2281, 2283 (2004) (highlighting premium increases in high-risk specialties such as
obstetrics, emergency medicine, general surgery, and radiology).
3. Id. at 2281.
4. Stephen C. Schoenbaum & Randall R. Bovbjerg, MalpracticeReform Must Include
Steps to Prevent Medical Injury, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 51, 51 (2004).

5. Mello et al., supra note 2, at 2281.
6. James Reason, Human Error: Models and Management, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 768, 768
(2000) (describing the two approaches to human fallibility-the person approach and the
system approach-and advocating the latter).
7. Id. at 768.
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medical error.8 Although the exact figures remain controversial, 9 the
dramatic statistics were not surprising to those that have long recognized
the frailties of the current healthcare delivery system. Over the years,
healthcare has become increasingly complex; Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement is less predictable, operating costs are less manageable,
workforce issues are more challenging, and the continuum of care is
increasingly fragmented. 10 These complexities contribute to a healthcare
system that is not as safe as it should be. Preventable medical errors as well
as the often unavoidable consequences associated with current high-risk
healthcare services contribute to a dangerous delivery system. Despite this,
many risk managers continue to meet resistance from within healthcare
organizations as they struggle to create a culture of safety and to eliminate
preventable medical errors. As one heavily entrenched in the struggle, Ms.
Youngberg suggested that a new way of thinking is required to solve the
problems of the current high-hazard healthcare environment.
II. A REVIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO RISK MANAGEMENT
The principles of risk management have historically been centered upon
three specific functions: loss prevention, claims management, and risk
financing. 1' These functions were generally addressed by a single risk
management department and had little, if any, overlap with the other
departments of the larger organization.1 2 Risk managers tended to be tacticoriented and had little appreciation for the long-term strategic goals of the
organization. The three functions were handled separately because the
managers failed to appreciate the concept of risk management as a whole.
The risk financing function of risk management is grounded in the
premise that an organization should transfer as much risk as it can afford to
transfer to a third party, especially in years when the insurance market is
both available and affordable. 13 When insurance was affordable, and
perhaps more importantly, available, most healthcare systems transferred all
their risk. This was particularly true when insurance prices were stable and
INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (2000).
8.
9. Clement J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors Are Exaggerated in
Institute of Medicine Report, 283 JAMA 93, 93 (2000). See also Rodney A. Hayward &
Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors, PreventabilityIs in
the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415, 415 (2001).
10. See generally PAUL STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
(1982).
11. Barbara J. Youngberg, Setting up a Risk Management Department, in THE RISK

MANAGER'S DESK REFERENCE 13, 13-18 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., 1994).

Id. at 18-23.
Id. at 14. See also A. Michele Kuhn, Introductionto Risk Management,in THE-RISK
MANAGER'S DESK REFERENCE 1, 1 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., 1994).
12.
13.
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the market was competitive for an expanding insurance industry. 14
Although a healthcare organization's transfer of risk provided its chief
financial officer with security by protecting the financial interests of the
organization, it compromised and diminished the importance of risk
management within the very organization it tried to protect.
While risk financing focused on transferring risk, the claims management
function of risk management addressed patient demands on the healthcare
organization, often via their attorneys, for monetary compensation when
negligence was alleged. When a claim was filed, or when the organization
believed that a claim might be filed, risk management carefully guarded any
and all information uncovered throughout the course of internal
investigations.' 5 To avoid exacerbation of damages for a particular claim,
risk managers often discouraged their organizations from sharing
information; the patient, the patient's family, and even individual
departments within the organization itself, who may have benefited from
such information, were instead kept in the dark. 16 The risk managers' task
was isolated to managing the claim itself, and resolving the claim with
minimal cost to the organization. Risk managers often failed to appreciate
the deleterious impact of ignoring the underlying need for organizational
improvement.17 In addition, because risk management prioritized
representation of the healthcare organization or provider, patients often felt
alienated and became angry and, understandably, litigious.' 8 Recent studies
have shown that many patients file malpractice claims in order to obtain
information about their injuries.' 9
A part of the claims management function of risk management is the
maintenance and design of the healthcare organization's incident reporting
system. 2°

Historically, this process included receiving copies of incident

reports completed by caregivers and establishing a claim file for those
incidents that seemed likely to give rise to claims. Near-miss events were
generally ignored or went unreported, and reported incidents that failed to
give rise to compensable claims were forgotten.
14. Kuhn, supranote 13, at 1.
15. Eric B. Larson, Measuring, Monitoring, and Reducing Medical Harm from a
Systems Perspective:A Medical Director'sPersonalReflections, 77 AcAD. MED. 993, 996

(2002).
16.

Barbara J. Youngberg, IntegratingPatient Support Services with Risk Management,

in THE RISK MANAGER'S DESK REFERENCE 105, 106-08 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., 1994).

17.

Id. at 106.

18. Youngberg, supra note 11, at 17.
19. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Malpractice
Claims FollowingPerinatalInjuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992).
20., Susan West et al., Risk Management Program Development, in THE RISK
MANAGER'S DESK REFERENCE 35, 36 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., 1994).
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Moreover, loss prevention focused on educating caregivers about basic
principles of risk management. 21 Typically, risk managers utilized closed
claims that had given rise to national lawsuits to discuss ways in which such
claims could be avoided, especially those involving high-risk specialties as
identified by insurance providers.22 Areas such as obstetrics, emergency
medicine, and anesthesiology were often the focus of risk management
education, regardless of whether those specialties were particularly
problematic for the individual healthcare organization.
The fact that medical error continues to be a significant problem for
healthcare organizations and providers suggests that past efforts have not
been uniformly successful. In addition, the increasing complexity of the
healthcare environment suggests that perhaps new techniques are required
to manage the current crisis.
III. THE NECESSITY OF FULL DISCLOSURE
Healthcare providers continue to struggle with the concept of disclosure
of errors or untoward events. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) mandates full disclosure of such
incidents, 23 but although most hospitals now claim to have implemented
policies complying with JCAHO's requirements, there is reason to believe
that true disclosure is not actually taking place.24 As an organization whose
mission is to improve the safety and quality of care provided to the public
through healthcare accreditation and related services that support
performance improvement in healthcare organizations, JCAHO regulations
assume that improvement in patient safety will be achieved by reducing the
number of medical errors that cause harm to patients. To achieve a
reduction in medical errors and to improve patient safety, JCAHO
regulations provide guidance and advise that organizations do the
following:
0

Identify the errors that occur.

Youngberg, supra note 11, at 17-20.
See Marie Anne Dizon, Developing a Comprehensive Quality Management Program
in Obstetrics, in THE RISK MANAGER'S DESK REFERENCE 395 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed.,
1994); Barbara Grand Sheridan, Risk Management in a Pediatric Setting, in THE RISK
MANAGER'S DESK REFERENCE 427 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., 1994); Barbara J. Youngberg,
Risk Management Issues Associated with Anesthesia, in THE RISK MANAGER'S DESK
REFERENCE 455 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., 1994).
23. See Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Reporting of
Medical/Health Care Errors, at http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+organizations/
patient+safety/medical+errors+disclosure/index.htm (last visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter
JCAHO Position Statement].
24. Studdert et al., supra note 1, at 287.
21.
22.
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Analyze each error to determine the underlying factors-the
"root causes"-that, if eliminated, could reduce the risk of
similar errors in the future.
Compile data about error frequency and type and the root causes
of these errors.
Disseminate information about these errors and their root causes
to permit health care organizations, where appropriate, to
redesign their systems and processes to reduce the risk of future
errors.
Periodically assess the effectiveness of the efforts taken to
reduce the risk of errors.2 5

In mandating error reporting from various healthcare organizations,
JCAHO hopes to identify root causes of error, make suggestions for system
redesign, and track the effectiveness of such efforts to reduce or eliminate
error over time.26 According to JCAHO, an effective error reporting system
would require that:
"
*
*

*

Reported events be well-defined and limited to serious adverse
events.
Reports include the findings of root cause analyses of adverse
events.
All information reported be legally protected from disclosure;
however, legitimate healthcare oversight bodies must have full
and timely access to data in the reporting system without waiver
of disclosure protection.
Legitimate healthcare oversight bodies play a central role in the
evaluation of root cause analyses and in the dissemination of
information to other healthcare institutions in order to facilitate
improvement of patient safety.27

Any lack of compliance with JCAHO's reporting mandates may be due
to lack of physician understanding of disclosure requirements coupled with
fear of litigation.28 Events often deemed "complications" by one physician
may be considered preventable errors by another physician, the healthcare
organization, or JCAHO. The IOM defines error as "the failure of a planned

25. JCAHO Position Statement, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Leslie D. Goode et al., When Is "Good Enough"? The Role and Responsibility of
Physicians to Improve PatientSafety, 77 AcAD. MED. 947, 948 (2002).
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action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an
aim.",29 Regardless, the semantics of terminology is detrimental to the
objective of full disclosure. Despite the enormous body of work published
regarding the importance and impact of disclosure to victims of medical
error, some risk managers, healthcare attorneys, administrators, and
physicians persist in the belief that such candor will "provide a roadmap for
a plaintiffs attorney, ' 30 create confusion for the patient and the patient's
family, and have dire economic consequences for the healthcare
organization. 3 ' In light of these fears, disclosure regulations must withstand
subpoena, discovery, introduction of evidence, testimony, or any other form
of disclosure in connection with a civil or administrative proceeding under
32
federal or state law, or under the Freedom of Information Act.
The IOM reports estimate the number of victims that suffer or die
annually from medical errors.33 These estimations are the subject of much
debate, but many would suggest that the actual statistics are less important
than the fact that anyone is the victim of preventable medical error.
Another IOM report, Crossing the Quality Chasm, states that "[t]rying
'34 The current
harder will not work. Changing systems of care will.
healthcare system has persistent safety and quality problems because it
relies on outmoded systems of work. Poor designs promote failure in the
workforce; fragmentation and the hierarchical structure of most healthcare
organizations impede the organization's ability to make true and lasting
progress. These barriers are compounded by the fact that risk management
functions in a manner divorced from the organization's overall structure.
Lack of integration translates to episodic-focused changes in lieu of
sustainable, organization-wide improvement.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR A MODERN APPROACH TO RISK MANAGEMENT
Currently, the goal of a successful and safe healthcare organization
35
High
should be to achieve status as a high-reliability organization.

29. Robert A. McNutt et al., Patient Safety Efforts Should Focus on MedicalErrors, 287
JAMA 1997, 1998 (2002) (citing INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY (2001)).

30. Barbara Youngberg, The Columbia Disasterfrom a Risk Manager's View, 22 J.
HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 3, 3-8 (2002).
31. Id.
32. JCAHO Position Statement, supra note 23.
33. Hayward, supra note 9, at 415.
34. INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2001).

35. Reason, supra note 6, at 769 (describing high reliability organizations as "systems
operating in hazardous conditions that have fewer than their fair share of adverse events").
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reliability organizations anticipate adverse events and prepare themselves to
react to setbacks at all levels of the organization.3 6 Such organizations have
recognized that errors or mishaps are patterned and linked to specific
systemic or environmental characteristics. It does not appear to matter
whether different people are involved; the same set of circumstances can
provoke similar errors. Accordingly, "[t]he pursuit of great safety is
seriously impeded by an approach that does not seek out and remove the
error provoking properties within the system at large."37
High reliability organizations have determined that incident reporting
and communication are critical to risk reduction and risk management. 38
These organizations address the individual and system reluctance to adhere
to reporting mandates by shifting the culture of the organization from
blaming individuals or simply reporting incidents to an arena of seeking
answers and patterns in order to shelter the organization from future risks.39
This response is in sharp contrast to those organizations that tend to
promote an environment of fear of litigation and focus strictly on
incentivizing
individual physicians to comply with reporting
4°
requirements.
Instead of viewing physicians as troublesome noncompliants to risk management, high reliability organizations incorporate
physician leadership and promote a partnership between the organization
and the individual physician. 4' In addition, risk management becomes
recognized as the job of all employees in the organization and becomes
decentralized to each department. With enhanced communication within
the structure of the organization, issues of concern are identified, shared,
discussed, and either modified or eliminated.4 2
With these system
safeguards and reforms in place, healthcare organizations can move beyond
the preventable medical errors themselves and focus on the larger picture.
Malpractice claims can be routed through "structured mediation,
administrative law hearings, or medical courts. '' 3 Organizations are then
better equipped to defend claims where there is obvious negligence and to
negotiate acceptable settlements. In this way, high reliability healthcare
36. Id. at 770.
37. Id. at 769.
38. Larson, supra note 15, at 996. See also Kathleen M. Sutcliffe et al., Communication
Failures:An Insidious Contributorto Medical Mishaps, 79 AcAD. MED. 186, 194 (2004).
39. Larson, supra note 15, at 997.
40. See Linda 0. Prager, Legal System Could Offer Safety Incentives, AMNEWS, June
12, 2000, availableat http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2000/06/12/prsbO612.htm
41. David C. Classen & Peter M. Kilbridge, The Roles and Responsibility of Physicians
to Improve PatientSafety Within Health Care Delivery Systems, 77 ACAD. MED. 963, 966
(2002).
42. See generally Sutcliffe et al., supra note 38, at 193.
43. Studdert et al., supra note 1, at 289.
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organizations are better able to take control over aspects of healthcare that
can be controlled, create environments of patient safety, and better manage
risk.
V. CONCLUSION

The current medical malpractice crisis has led to much speculation about
its cause and potential solutions. The legal system, insurance industry, and
healthcare institutions have each been under attack to solve the problem
quickly and with minimal cost. Individual blame is masked well by the
larger, faceless institutions deemed responsible.
At Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Annual Health Law and
Policy Consortium, Ms. Barbara Youngberg urged listeners to examine the
individual faces within the problem and to seek crisis solutions closer to
home. She urged healthcare institutions to focus their risk management
efforts in the hope of alleviating the medical malpractice crisis. By
acknowledging preventable medical errors and seeking institution-wide
solutions for eliminating them, she challenged each healthcare organization
to achieve accountability and increase patient safety. In doing so, she
articulated that healthcare institutions will become high reliability
organizations, thereby integrating loss prevention, claims management, and
risk financing effectively. Thus, Ms. Youngberg's solution to the current
medical malpractice crisis is efficient risk management.
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